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Abstract:  
In this article I look at the emotional effects of alienation in modern capitalist 
societies. I begin by considering Marx’s theory of alienation, focusing especially 
on the alienation between people and between them and the social institutions 
to which they should be connected. In this way, alienation is understood as a 
form of estrangement within social relations and I draw out the emotional 
implications of this, in terms of the relations between people and in the way 
people feel about their own self. This is enhanced through an understanding of 
emotions as relational phenomena, a position highly attuned to Marx’s own 
mode of social analysis. I then illustrate and develop this understanding of 
alienation and emotion by drawing on the empirical examples of political 
relations and property relations in the UK, concluding with a discussion of what 
this tells us about alienation and emotion in contemporary capitalist societies. 
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Alienation and Emotion: Social Relations and Estrangement in 
Contemporary Capitalism 
 
There is a rich seam of literature in social science and philosophy on alienation 
and emotion, but this tends towards the view that alienation creates emotional 
numbness or a condition in which we fail to connect with our emotions properly, 
thus experiencing inauthentic emotion. In key work in the social sciences this has 
been seen as the result of the commercialisation of emotion in the workplace 
(Hochschild, 1983; Brewer, 2011) and in philosophy as the outcome of general 
processes of emotional self-alienation (Szanto, 2017). I want to take a different 
approach to alienation and the emotions in this article, arguing that alienation 
does not always result in a loss of connection to our emotions or their sense of 
authenticity. Instead, I will make the case that alienated social relations produce 
strong emotions that result from those relations, telling us something about 
what is going on in our societies. In doing this I want to build on Marx’s theory of 
alienation, drawing out its implications for emotion. This creates a different 
approach to emotion within capitalism to that which Illouz (2007) has called 
‘emotional capitalism’. In her approach, emotional and economic discourses and 
practices mutually shape each other, so that affect becomes an essential aspect of 
economic behaviour, while emotional life is shaped by economic relations and by 
markets. Although this work is important and highly illuminating, it does tend to 
focus on how this broad process of emotionalising capitalism has affected middle 
class women and men in the workplace and the family, overlooking class conflict 
and inequality, as well as touching only lightly on alienation. 
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In what follows I will address this by concentrating on the issue of alienation and 
emotion in aspects of a contemporary capitalist society like the UK. In the first 
section here I will focus on Marx’s theory of alienation, particularly in terms of 
the alienation of humans from one another and from key forms of social 
organisation in capitalism, such as the state and the realm of politics, drawing 
out the implications of this for emotions. In the second section I will briefly 
elaborate the theoretical move to understand emotions as relational phenomena, 
something that I believe ties in closely with Marx’s relational view of social 
science. Then in the third section I will illustrate and develop the understanding 
of alienation and emotion by drawing on empirical examples centred on recent 
political events in the UK and in property relations. I then discuss the 
implications of these examples for our understanding of emotions in 
contemporary capitalism. 
 
Marx and alienation 
In Marx’s thinking, alienation is one of the results of capitalist social relations 
and it occurs when the things that human beings produce come to stand against 
them as something alien – that is, as objects in which they recognise nothing of 
themselves or of their own productive activity (Marx, 1977). This happens in 
capitalism because workers do not own the objects they produce and also 
because, in highly specialised divisions of labour (created in the drive for 
profitability), workers may not see the end product of their work activity, nor 
feel any connection to it. Under such conditions, commodities appear on the 
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market as if by magic, because we do not feel any connection to the labour 
activity that has produced them, either our own or that of others. We are then 
sold products that become, if we can afford to buy them, individual possessions 
that have no connection to the wider social whole that has produced them. 
However, alienation has greater ramifications than this for human beings. 
Because Marx understood humans as a species that enter into social relations in 
order to produce the means of subsistence, which is a unique characteristic of 
human beings, in losing contact with the object of production we also lose 
contact with our own nature as species-beings. And because production is 
essentially a social activity, we also lose touch with each other in the collective 
effort of production. In production, the capitalist (or the manager or boss) is a 
representative of that class and stands over and against the workers as a hostile 
power, organising and disciplining labour purely in the pursuit of profit and 
greater efficiency. The workers too are often forced to compete against one 
another, either as individuals or in teams, to boost productivity and thus come to 
see themselves as isolated individuals pursuing their own interests. As Ollman 
(1971) puts it, for Marx an alienated person is ‘separated from his fellow men 
(competition and class hostility have rendered most forms of cooperation 
impossible)’ (p. 134). Additionally, workers can become distanced from their 
own activity, especially if they are working purely in order to earn a wage and 
have no other personal investment or interest in the job they are doing. 
In summary, then, it can be said that for Marx alienation occurs in the relation of 
humans; 1) to the things we produce, 2) to our own nature as humans or species-
beings, 3) to each other, and 4) to our own activity (Marx, 1977; Ollman, 1971). It 
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is the third aspect of alienation that I will focus on here, the alienation of humans 
in their relations to one another and to their own self – these two relations being 
inextricably bound together – and the emotional effects of this. Suffice to say for 
now that it should be clear from what has gone before that alienation is a 
condition bound up with social relations. Indeed, as Ollman (1971) points out, all 
the units in Marx’s analysis, including society, are understood relationally, so 
that ‘Capital, labour, value, commodity, etc., are all grasped as relations, 
containing in themselves, as integral elements of what they are, those parts of 
which we tend to see them externally tied’ (p. 15). Thus, relations in Marx are 
conceived of not as external relations – that is, the relation between things that 
would remain the same in their essence even if the relations between them 
changed – but instead as internal relations. This means that, in Marx’s view, 
relations are internal to each factor in his analysis because they are ontological – 
it is the relation between things that gives each one its essence, rather than some 
pre-given essence that inheres within it, a priori. 
Alienation is therefore also to be conceived of relationally. As Jaeggi (2014) puts 
it, alienation is a relation of relationlessness: not in the sense of the absence of a 
relation but rather of a relation that is in some way deficient. There is a 
detachment or separation between people or things that in fact belong together, 
‘the loss of a connection between two things that nevertheless stand in relation 
to one another’ (Jaeggi, 2014, p. 25). For Marx, alienation is also referred to as ‘a 
mistake, a defect, which ought not to be’ and as the ‘realm of estrangement’ 
(Ollman, 1971, p. 132). This is really important and I will continue to refer to 
alienation as estrangement, because it is a deficient, broken relation – a 
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separation between people, or between people and things, that are, or ought to 
be, related. To be a stranger is to be unknown in a particular place or community, 
as in ‘I was a stranger in the city’. But to be estranged is to be known and have a 
prior relationship only for it to be damaged (‘I am now estranged from my 
family’) or for it to be deficient (‘I am estranged from my father, we’ve always 
had a difficult relationship’). However, for Marx, alienation is both more specific 
and more widespread than this, because it is ingrained in the nature of capitalist 
social relations where, as was noted above, there is a break or separation 
between people, both within and between social classes. Here, the alienated 
person is an ‘abstraction’ – a term Marx used to refer to any factor which appears 
isolated from the social whole of which it is a part, thus losing its sense and 
meaning. Society also becomes a ‘fixed abstraction’ opposed to the individual 
(Marx, 1977, p. 91), in that although society only exists because it is produced 
and reproduced through the activities of individuals who stand in relation to one 
another, it nevertheless comes to feel as though it is an alien or coercive power 
separated from us, over which we have little power or influence to change it. 
Thus, an… 
 
…alienated world presents itself to individuals as insignificant and 
meaningless, as rigidified or impoverished, as a world that is not one’s 
own, which is to say, a world in which one is not ‘at home’ and over which 
one can have no influence (Jaeggi, 2014, p. 3). 
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Despite the fact that humans are social beings, through alienated relations we 
come to feel as though the society we jointly create stands above us as an alien 
power, and that our fellow humans are, like our own self, primarily isolated 
individuals with deficient social relations to connect us (except, perhaps, for 
particular relationships in which we feel close and connected to others). It is not, 
therefore, only objects of production that people create and yet come to feel 
alienated from: this can also happen with respect to social forms, such as 
organisations, institutions, governments, political parties, etc. As Ollman (1971) 
puts it, ‘parliaments, laws and the rest have assumed the guise of quasi-supreme 
beings to which their own creators are asked to pay obedience’ (p. 216). 
Alongside this, and in becoming alienated from each other and from social 
institutions, people can also be alienated in the relation to their own self. Marx 
(1977) says that the ‘alienation of man and in general of every relationship in 
which man stands to himself is first realised and expressed in the relationship 
with which man stands to other men’ (p. 83). Thus, the way we come to see our 
own self is the result of these deficient relationships in which we only recognise 
our self and others through the qualities that accrue to each of us in our class 
position. People react to one another as a ‘kind’ or ‘type’ or ‘role’, and only 
indirectly to the individual as a reflection of it, to their all-round uniqueness as a 
person. The Marxist literary theorist, Mikhail Bakhtin, gives a good example of 
this from a scene in Dostoevsky’s novel Poor Folk, in which a poor man overhears 
someone say that the most important virtue in a citizen is to earn money and not 
be a burden on society. In an internal dialogue with himself, the poor man 
answers the stranger back, saying to himself that - ‘I’m not a burden to anyone. 
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My crust of bread is my own…earned by my toil and put to lawful and 
irreproachable use’ (Dostoevsky in Bakhtin, 1984, p. 207). 
In a scene such as this, reminiscent of the kind of interactions that happen in 
everyday life, referring to social categories – a ‘poor person’ or a ‘good citizen’ – 
entails a whole host of moral evaluations, such as the poor do not earn money 
and are a burden on society. This entails what Bakhtin (1984) calls an 
‘emotional-evaluative’ stance, in that seeing someone as of more or less worth 
makes them feel something, like a sense of pride and self-worth or shame and a 
sense of low-worth. We can see this in the response of the poor man in his own 
internal dialogue, who clearly feels that the overheard comment could reflect 
negatively on him: feeling degraded and ashamed he answers back that although 
he doesn’t earn much money, he does so by his own toil and can feed and care for 
himself, therefore making himself feel proud of his efforts. His comment about 
putting his earnings to lawful and irreproachable use is also his way of saying ‘I 
am a good citizen’ and to make himself feel worthy in what he does. This is an 
example of what Marx said above, about how the alienation of every relationship 
in which a person stands to them self is first realised and expressed in the 
relationships with which a person stands to others. What the example of the 
poor man shows, though, is that these relationships also have emotional 
dimensions through the emotional-evaluative stances taken towards others and 
towards one’s self. 
It is important to note, though, that the emotional injuries of misrecognition is 
not just a matter of being looked down on but, as Holmes and McKenzie (2018) 
point out, being denied the status of a full partner in interaction and prevented 
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from participating in social life as a peer. Furthermore, I would add that it is not 
just in interpersonal relationships that alienation and its emotional dimension is 
revealed. It can also be revealed in those social institutions that come to stand 
over and against us as alien, powerful and dominating forces. For Marx, as for 
Hegel before him, human individuality is a social achievement in that each 
person only individuates them self within the social whole. As Marxists see it, 
each person appropriates the human heritage – which is created through human 
activity in the course of history – through their activities in society, realising 
their own powers and developing capacities to act in particular ways: say, in 
becoming a scientist or an artist, making their own contribution to the 
furtherance of culture. Appropriation therefore occurs actively as we build 
elements of the human heritage into our own character as capacities, expressing 
these in our own particular way. According to Hegel, we also realise the 
particularity of the self in the ethical universality of human society, so that 
alienation represents a deficiency in the relation of self to the social whole 
(Jaeggi, 2014). This reflects in institutions that stand in opposition to us rather 
than being ones in which we can recognise ourselves, identifying with them and 
realising our ethical powers in relation to them – such as the law, government, 
politics, or civic life. Here, what G. H. Mead (1934) called the ‘generalised other’ – 
the organised collective attitudes in society embodied in social institutions such 
as law, politics, or religion – feels as though it opposes us in our own 
consciousness, our own internalised dialogue, perhaps condemning us in the 
way the poor man in Dostoevsky’s novel felt condemned. This can occur in social 
ideologies or attitudes that denigrate specific social groups – the ‘feckless poor’, 
the ‘idle rich’, the criminalised racial minority, etc. As I will show throughout the 
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rest of this piece, these kinds of alienated relationships also have emotional 
dimensions to them. 
Before I move on to the topic of emotions, there is one final point I want to make 
about alienation. That is, not all relationships and activities within capitalist 
societies are alienated to the same degree. Some relationships and activities are 
less alienated than others, giving us scope to realise our human powers and 
capacities. For example, as the French Marxist Lucien Sève (1978) claimed, there 
are many relationships and activities across the range of our biographies in 
which we can realise our potentials, learn new capacities, and create individual 
identities. This is influenced by social class, in that the middle class may have 
greater access to more fulfilling professions, in which there is more scope to 
learn new skills and, thus, for self-development and the sense of higher self-
esteem. Yet everyone has some aspect of their lives that are not alienated, where 
their relationships and activities are less deficient, otherwise it would be 
impossible to recognise alienation as a condition – that is, to know that certain 
relationships are deficient. Alienation is not, then, – certainly not in the tradition 
of Hegel and Marx – a universal condition of the individual in society, as in some 
existential forms of thought, nor is alienation universal and evenly distributed 
across capitalist societies. Even here, there are some relationships in which we 
feel as though others know and value us as a person rather than as a category or 
type: they see us in the round as opposed to seeing only one side of us, leading to 
greater emotional fulfilment. 
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Emotions in relationships 
In a similar way to the units in Marx’s analysis, which are seen to be formed 
relationally rather than as units that existed prior to the relations that connect 
them, those who theorise emotions as relationships do not conceive of emotions 
as something given in themselves – such as biologically fixed bodily responses to 
external stimuli that appear the same everywhere, across all human societies, 
whenever those stimuli appear. Instead of this, emotions are to be understood as 
bodily feelings that are formed within the social relations and activities that give 
them meaning and value (Burkitt, 2014). Emotions, then, are part of human 
activity and are experiences that emerge out of specific situations in which we 
are related to other people and things in a socially meaningful way. Thus, 
although emotions are associated with certain bodily feelings and with our 
reflexive consciousness of them as experiences we can verbalise and reflect on, 
these would not make sense without the specific relational situation in which 
they have emerged. This means that when we think of emotions we should not 
conceive of them primarily as things belonging to us as individuals – like the 
feeling called ‘love’ or ‘anger’ – but rather as patterns of relationship we are 
woven into and which form our interconnection with other people and things. 
‘Love’, then, is an indication about the people and things we value the most and 
also about the relation of those people and things to us – a love lost, a new love 
found, or a love that is unrequited. Emotions are relational in that they always 
inform us about the relationships we have to other people and things. 
The relational approach to emotions, then, is close to Emirbayer’s (1997) model 
of relational sociology, in that the social world is not understood as primarily 
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consisting in substances or things. Instead, the relational perspective 
understands the units of enquiry (such as emotions) to derive their meaning, 
significance, and identity from their emergence in social relations. Following 
from this, for me, emotions are to be understood as produced in the activities of 
people who stand in relation to one another, so that emotions always carry 
implicit or explicit meaning and value, which is both social and personal, 
orienting us in the social world. In the case of alienation, though, given that these 
relations are ones of estrangement and are deficient, perhaps we should say that 
to some degree they disorientate us, reflecting our distorted relations to others. 
This was illustrated in the case of the ‘poor man’ from Dostoevsky’s novel, 
recounted above, where this man felt himself looked down on by those higher up 
the social order because he was poor and excluded from full participation in 
social action as a complete citizen. This relation led to an emotional-evaluative 
stance in which the poor man felt degraded and belittled, but it also motivated 
him to counteract these feelings with words of his own about himself that made 
him feel proud and worthwhile. His emotions are relational in that his feelings 
would not make sense outside of the situation in which he overheard a 
derogatory remake about the poor: however, they are also ideological in that 
they involve socially meaningful attitudes adopted towards people within the 
relational network of a social hierarchy. In dominant ideologies, the wealthy and 
powerful are accorded a higher status and social value than those below them, 
along with greater powers to act. Relations and ideologies therefore create 
evaluations that are integral to emotions – the feelings we have about others and, 
through them, about our own self as well. 
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Alienation and emotion in politics and property relations 
In this section I will elaborate on the theory of alienation between people – and 
between people and institutions – by looking at recent studies of politics and 
emotions in the UK. Here, I focus on the attitudes of working class people 
towards political parties and the way they voted in the 2010 and 2015 general 
elections and in the 2016 referendum on the UK’s membership of the European 
Union (EU). I also focus on the alienated nature of property relations in the 
modern, rapidly gentrifying city. Under the subheadings below, I draw on 
Holmes and Manning’s studies of working class voters in the North of England 
leading up to the 2010 general election (Holmes and Manning, 2013; Manning 
and Holmes, 2013) and on Mckenzie’s (2017a; 2017b) ethnographic studies of 
working class communities in East London and the East Midlands during the 
2015 general election and the referendum on EU membership in 2016. Although 
these authors do not refer to alienation in their studies, I think the effects of this, 
and its links to emotions, can be seen in the results of their ethnographic work. I 
will also supplement this with some examples of newspaper reporting of the 
views of people caught up in the Grenfell Tower fire disaster in North 
Kensington, West London, on 14th June 2017. Together, I feel these examples 
allow me to demonstrate important aspects of alienation and emotions in regard 
to two separate issues: first, in respect of politics and political relations in the UK 
in recent years, and second with regard to property relations and the 
relationship of communities to their local authority and the national government 
(indeed, to ‘authorities’ more generally). These examples allow me to put some 
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flesh onto the bones of the theoretical consideration of alienation and emotion in 
the first two sections of this article and also to develop this theory. 
 
Alienation and emotion in politics 
During the 2000s the steady decline in people voting in UK elections, especially 
in poorer areas of the country and among the young, was attributed in popular 
discourse to a growing apathy among these groups in regard to political 
participation. This is challenged in the work of Holmes and Manning who did 
qualitative interviews with voters in working class areas of Yorkshire and the 
North West of England in the run-up to the 2010 general election. They recruited 
participants for their interviews in areas where there had been a decline in the 
turnout at the European elections in 2004 and 2009, which had allowed the far-
right British National Party (BNP) a greater percentage of the vote. All their 
participants were white in terms of their ethnicity and were working class, in 
that they all did low-paid unskilled or semi-skilled work, although none had 
actually voted for the BNP. Instead, they all voiced a cynical disengagement with 
mainstream politics and political parties, although Holmes and Manning’s 
findings show this does not mean they were apathetic, as all participants had 
opinions and feelings about politics and the deprivation they were facing. 
What was common among their participants was the expressed feeling of being 
‘fed-up’ with the current political and economic status quo and having little 
expectation that the upcoming 2010 general election would bring any significant 
beneficial change for them, no matter which political party won (Holmes and 
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Manning, 2013). Because of this they were disengaged rather than apathetic 
about politics, seeing politicians as too distant from them and their own 
everyday, local concerns. This distance seemed to take two main forms. First, 
politicians were seen as coming from wealthy elites and so were unable to 
understand the daily struggles of people on low wages, living in communities 
blighted by social and economic disadvantage. This was expressed by one person 
who remarked of the Conservative Party leader at the time, David Cameron, ‘he’s 
snooty ‘im’ (Manning and Holmes, 2013, p. 483). Second, the sense of distance 
was manifested as politicians being located in Westminster in the heart of 
London and so unfamiliar with the poverty and decline of the deindustrialised 
areas of the North of England. Politicians were seen as ‘far away’ from the living 
conditions of working class people and the problems of local areas, and politics 
in general was too ‘top-down’ to be relevant to local concerns (Holmes and 
Manning, 2013, p. 488). Although the people in this study had no sympathy with 
the overtly racist policies of the BNP, they did express dissatisfaction with the 
Labour Party – that once had represented the interests of the working class – 
feeling frustrated that it had adopted policies too close to those of the 
Conservative’s. One person remarked that Tony Blair’s idea of ‘New Labour’ 
showed ‘no commitment to social to what socialism or nationalisation, which 
meant they’re fairly middle of the road really’ (in Holmes and Manning, 2013, p. 
487). Overall people in the study felt disengaged from mainstream politics, were 
angry about the recent Member of Parliament’s expenses scandal – where the 
media had found evidence of some MP’s abusing expense claims – and were 
frustrated with a political elite who seemed out of touch with the hardships faced 
by working class voters. 
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In a similar vein, Mckenzie’s (2017a) work shows a widening distance between 
marginalised working class voters and the established political parties. She 
interviewed groups of working class men and women in East London during the 
2015 general election campaign and found growing dissatisfaction with the main 
parties. For example, one woman, Anne, who would normally vote for the Labour 
Party, said she wasn’t going to bother voting because she didn’t like the then 
Labour leader (Ed Miliband) and because national politics didn’t reflect local 
concerns about schools, housing and the state of the health service. When asked 
if not voting might make these things worse, with all the cuts to public spending 
coming down the line, she replied ‘Worse than what? Worse than now?! I’m not 
sure it can get any worse can it?’ (in Mckenzie, 2017a, p. 203). In the group of 
men Mckenzie interviewed most said that if they were going to vote they would 
vote for UKIP (the UK Independence Party who campaigned on issues of 
immigration and leaving the EU), although most admitted after the election that 
they hadn’t voted at all. The reason for this was similar to the women, in that 
they felt excluded from political decision-making over things that were affecting 
them locally, in particular the precarious nature of their employment and lack of 
a good, steady income. In general, people didn’t vote because they ‘did not see a 
direct connection between themselves, their political and social position and the 
general election’ (Mckenzie, 2017a, p.204). 
In contrast to this, these same people felt energized and enthusiastic about 
voting in the European referendum. In the group of women Mckenzie was 
researching, the same woman mentioned above, Anne, was encouraging her 
friends to register to vote, then to vote to leave the EU. During the referendum 
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campaign the women also responded angrily to experts and the rich and famous 
who were advising people to vote to remain in the EU. Responding to a report 
that the footballer David Beckham was apparently advising people to vote 
Remain, the women gave vent to their anger, referring to their main issues about 
schools and housing: 
 
Anne: ‘That fucking David Beckham can fuck right off, telling people to 
vote Remain’ 
Sarah: ‘What does he know about anything? When has he had to struggle 
to get his kids into school?’ 
Sally: ‘Yeah, him and Posh got no housing problems, apart from which one 
are they going to live in!’ (in Mckenzie, 2017a, p. 205). 
 
For me, the above is an interesting vignette, because it shows that the women, in 
their reasoning and their emotions, are acutely attuned to their situation – a lack 
of good school places in their area and a lack of affordable housing – and their 
relationship to the rich and famous, for whom these things are not a problem. 
There is an estrangement in the relation between the social classes, especially 
with the political class, and a sense of unfairness, injustice and exclusion. There 
is also a lack of mutual recognition and understanding expressed in the prior 
disengagement with the 2015 election campaign and now the excitement and 
anger of the 2016 referendum, with many believing the established parties are 
no longer listening to them or representing their interests. After the Leave result 
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in the referendum some of the women were overjoyed. However, others said that 
they did not think things would be better for them out of the EU but that they 
thought things couldn’t get worse or that they couldn’t stand things being the 
same (Mckenzie, 2017a). 
In contrast to the anger, frustration and disconnection that Mckenzie 
encountered in East London, in the ex-mining communities of Nottinghamshire 
and Derbyshire in the East Midlands of England studied after the referendum, 
she found feelings of sadness, loss and fear, despite the fact many had voted 
Leave. These towns had suffered deindustrialisation with the loss of jobs in 
mining and manufacturing since the 1980s, such jobs being replaced in the 
2000s by employment in warehouses and distribution centres that create work 
which is, in comparison, low-skilled and poorly paid. In this region, Mckenzie 
(2017b) spoke to two groups of women who had worked in the clothing 
manufacturing industry and two groups of men who had been miners. The 
people in these groups felt abandoned by traditional British political parties, felt 
the loss of self-respect and status that skilled jobs in once key British industries 
had brought them, along with fear about the break-up of their communities and 
the loss of younger family members moving away from the area to find work. 
Although Mckenzie, as well as Holmes and Manning, do not mention alienation in 
their research, I feel that the concept of alienation can add an extra dimension to 
the interpretation of their findings. I would argue that the distance, 
disengagement, and abandonment people feel with respect to politicians and 
political parties is an expression of the estrangement typical of alienation – of a 
broken or deficient relation that people feel between themselves and the 
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established political parities. This is so especially in relation to the Labour Party 
that at one time sought to represent the interests of the British working class. In 
addition, the hostility that many working class voters showed to the EU in the 
2016 referendum displays estrangement from the political system at an 
international level. Alienation is therefore evident in the relation between people 
and the political system, including all the institutions that compose it – local, 
national, and international governments, along with the political parties that 
make the democratic system of government work. People felt abandoned by the 
political class and that the established political parties no longer represented 
their local concerns, such as the state of schools, housing and employment. All of 
this perhaps explains the fall in membership of political parties across Europe, 
and the fact that parities now seek to present themselves as responsible 
economic managers, particularly to financial markets, but are not responsive to 
voters or representative of particular class identities (Mair, 2013). From the 
point of view of my interest here, these alienated relations work themselves out 
differently in the social contexts and situations where they are found, creating 
the emotions of dissatisfaction and anger, or sadness, loss and fear. 
In these emotions we see what E. P. Thompson (1980) called a structure of 
feeling – a pattern of emotions felt by members of a social class in response to 
commonly experienced and emergent economic and social conditions. Similar to 
the structure of feeling Thompson noted among working class people in the early 
1800s, we see in the studies above the loss of self-respect and status among the 
working class that results from losing well paid and skilled jobs in prestige 
industries, and the fear of losing family and community – social networks that 
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provided a source of identity, mutual support and solidarity for working people. 
Many of those in Mckenzie’s study were also mortified at the way people like 
themselves – working class people who had voted Leave – were represented in 
the Remain camp after the referendum, as being racist, uneducated and not 
knowing what they voted for. Their concerns about immigration were to do with 
its effects on pay, jobs, and increased pressures on already stretched social 
services, getting worse due to the austerity cuts in public spending after the 
financial crash of 2008. The alienation of social relations reflects in this loss of 
mutual recognition and the resulting misunderstanding and misrepresentation 
of people in different social classes, the relations between which are increasingly 
estranged, deficient, and broken by growing inequalities. 
 
Alienation and emotion in property relations and in relation to authorities 
A key concern of many working class residents of London is the trend that has 
become known in the UK as ‘social cleansing’. This term refers to the suspected 
attempt of local authorities and property developers to move traditional 
residents out of certain areas of London and, with property prices so high, to sell 
off the land where working class residents live – often in council owned and 
rented properties or in social housing owned and rented by housing association 
charities – to build properties for sale or rent at much higher prices. This is a 
concern of ‘Peter’, one of the participants in Mckenzie’s (2017b) study, a 66 year-
old retired street cleaner who has always lived in the East End of London. In fact, 
Peter lives in one of the few remaining blocks of housing association flats in his 
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area, where he still likes to walk the streets everyday just as he did when he was 
cleaning them. On a day when Mckenzie accompanied him on his walk, Peter was 
complaining about the ‘Yuppie drones’ invading the area, with shiny new 
apartment blocks and suites of offices being built everywhere around him. He 
says he doubts that he will survive this invasion and that he feels like he lives on 
a ‘reservation’. Looking in a showroom for a block of flats, the workers there 
seem annoyed that Peter is staring at them and wave him off, with Peter 
responding by sticking two fingers up at them in an angry gesture and telling 
them to ‘fuck off’. A security guard comes out and follows Mckenzie and Peter as 
they walk off down the road, with Peter turning and giving the two-finger salute 
to him as well. Further on they come across a father and his three children, the 
kids playing in the water feature of another new development in the area. Again, 
a security guard appears to move the family on with the father shouting, ‘Where 
are we supposed to go, my kids have got nothing’, to which the guard responds, 
‘You do not belong here, this is not for you’ (in Mckenzie, 2017b, p. S273). 
For me this is an example of alienated relations and the emotions expressed here 
reflect that. For Peter, the wealthier office workers and residents moving into the 
area are ‘Yuppie drones’, an alien invasion driving out older working class 
residents like him self. His expressions of anger at them are a reflection of his 
sense of estrangement from them, and likewise they see him as a nuisance to be 
moved on. The security guards moving residents off these private properties are 
working people, not dissimilar in their social class and status from Peter or the 
young family, the father of which said his kids had nothing. However, in their 
role as security guards for private property, both Peter and the young family 
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were seen as loitering in a place where they didn’t belong, a place that is ‘not for 
you’. The irritation and hostility in this comment represents the security guard’s 
attitude to those he sees as loitering, but Peter and the young family have 
nowhere else to go. All the participants in these interactions are responding to 
each other as types instead of as fully rounded characters: Peter to the ‘Yuppie 
drones’; the office workers and security guards to local residents they see as 
loiterers who are out of place and shouldn’t be there. Given this these alienated 
interactions are coloured with anger and hostility. When Mckenzie asked Peter 
about his participation in recent elections and the referendum, it turned out he 
hadn’t voted, saying ‘Will any of it stop all of this?’ (2017b, p. S273), expressing 
his sense of hopelessness. 
Interactions like the ones above are for me situations, meaning specifically they 
are scenarios located in place and time within which specific relations play 
themselves out – in this case class relations and relations of private property. 
Individuals in these situations are particular selves with their own unique 
biography and personal experiences, yet because of the alienated nature of their 
relationships they appear only as representatives of a kind, type, or role. This 
then involves misrecognition; which is to say, people seeing each other only as a 
type and not the person – the real living individual – within it. The emotions that 
are generated in these situations are part of this, in that they reflect the relations 
between kinds and not that between selves or persons. If the people met in other 
circumstances where they could get to know one another as persons, they may 
find they had much more in common. However, in situations like the ones above, 
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in the play of alienated relations, that is not possible. This is because these 
situations are the scenes of wider class and property relations. 
These wider class relations are also evident in people’s relationships to 
authorities, institutions, and government, something that was seen in 2017 with 
the Grenfell Tower fire disaster in North Kensington, West London. The fire 
broke out in a high-rise block of flats in the early morning of 14th June and up to 
this point in time it is thought 72 people died. Grenfell Tower was built as council 
housing and mainly housed working class residents, many of them from different 
ethnic minorities, with a small number of flats being privately owned and 
occupied or leased out for private rent. However, most flats were owned and 
rented by the local council (the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea) with 
the tower block being managed by a Tenant Management Organisation (TMO) 
made up of residents, council-appointed members, and independent members. 
This particular Borough of London is one of the richest in Britain with Grenfell 
Tower being surrounded by more affluent neighbourhoods. After the fire it 
became clear from reports in the media that local residents had long complained 
about safety fears inside the block of flats, with a tenants’ action group having 
been formed, feeling that the council and their appointees on the TMO were not 
listening to their concerns. Many residents felt the local authority wanted them 
out of the Borough so the land could be sold to build more expensive housing, 
something that was reflected after the fire when many residents who had lost 
their homes insisted they be temporarily rehoused in the Borough so the council 
could not use this as an opportunity to move them out of the area. 
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A few examples from the media give an indication of the feelings and emotions of 
local residents who had been affected by the fire in its immediate aftermath. A 
report from the day of the fire talks of the grief and frustration of those looking 
for loved ones or desperately searching for news of them, while others were 
looking for a place to stay. There was also anger and frustration that there was 
no relief effort from local or national government, which seemed entirely absent, 
and in its place local charities, such as Islamic Relief, their workers and 
volunteers, were providing aid. With no official lines of communication the 
charities were communicating through WhatsApp and local people were 
bringing supplies – such as food, water and clothing – for the victims of the fire 
(The Guardian, 2017a). In a video posted the following day by a national 
newspaper, people express their pride in their fellow local residents who pulled 
together to help out, with one man saying, ‘People care for each other, its 
beautiful to see’. Another resident praised the young people of the area and their 
efforts to help, bringing food and other items. However, one women voiced her 
anger at the authorities, in that ‘A building like that wouldn’t be built in a rich 
area. Because everyone who lives here is poor and working class, that’s why it 
happened’ (The Guardian, 2017b). 
Amidst the pride, solidarity, grief and mourning, a sense of anger and injustice 
was clearly aimed at all authorities. On the evening after the fire a group of men 
tried to protect a distraught woman when a journalist moved in to film her, 
causing a clash with police involving shouting and screaming (The Guardian, 
2017a). The following day when the Queen came to visit the scene and meet with 
local residents, a journalist recorded the following incident: 
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One man shouted furiously at her [the Queen’s] departing car, holding a 
photo of two babies he said were family members. He said they were “left 
to die in that tower”, adding: “Where was the Queen before this? Where 
was the government? Where was the media? You only come now! Left to 
die here by all of you, and the police, and firefighters.”  
“Not the police and firefighters,” another local said. “OK, not them,” he 
said (The Guardian, 2017c). 
 
Protestors also organised a march through central London that passed Downing 
Street, chanting ‘No justice, no peace’. In Kensington hundreds of people tried to 
force their way into the Town Hall, demanding that local councillors come out of 
their offices to answer questions. Specifically, they wanted assurances that local 
people who had lost their homes in the fire would be rehoused in the area and 
not moved out. The Prime Minster also needed police protection as she came to 
the area to meet with local residents. On leaving the meeting ‘an angry crowd of 
locals booed her and told her forcefully that she was not welcome there’ (The 
Guardian, 2017d). 
A number of things emerge from this important for my analysis of alienation. 
First, it is important to note that the residents living in and around the Grenfell 
Tower area are not totally powerless or alienated, as they draw huge strength 
and resilience from local relationships with friends and neighbours, in which 
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there is clearly mutual respect and recognition. They are not simply isolated 
individuals who appear divorced from some generalised social whole, but have 
solidarity and resources from those close to them. From interviews in the 
newspapers and on television they are articulate and sure of themselves. And yet 
they are clearly alienated from authorities who, they feel, haven’t listened to 
them, do not represent them, and indeed are actively hostile to them in that they 
do not want them living in the area. In the aftermath of the fire both local and 
national government effectively abandoned them and left them to manage by 
their own resources. Their anger, despair, grief and loss all speak to their 
alienation from authority and the situation this has created: and it is only in that 
situation that their feelings and emotions take on sense and meaning. 
 
Discussion 
What I have been arguing here is that alienation does not only create a situation 
where people feel divorced from their feelings and emotions. Indeed in many 
respects the opposite is the case, in that feelings and emotions, along with 
people’s practical reasoning about their situation, tells them a great deal about 
the alienated aspects of their social relations. Feelings, emotions, and practical 
reasoning reflect the increasingly unequal and unfair nature of social relations in 
neoliberal, globalised capitalist relations, where conventional politics and 
political parties that are meant to represent different sections of the population, 
have in effect abandoned the poorer strata of society and the working class in 
order to bail out failed financial institutions and deregulate markets to facilitate 
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capital accumulation. Those left out of economic growth and the political 
calculations of parties attempting to win over key voters, feel abandoned and 
estranged from authorities and institutions to which they have a vital 
relationship as citizens, such as political parities, local, national and international 
governments, and the media. There is also a structure of feeling among many 
working class communities that once took pride in skilled, relatively well-paid 
work, which involves the loss of status in the eyes of others and in their own 
sense of self-respect, as the basis of their standing in society – decent work, 
community identity and solidarity, and strong family ties – are undermined or 
threatened. The result is anger at authorities and established centres of political 
power and feelings of sadness and fear about what has been lost and what is still 
under threat. 
I think Ollman (1971) is wrong, therefore, when he says that in alienated 
relations people ‘cannot respond either emotionally or intellectually in the 
manner which takes their objective conditions fully into account’ (p. 238). On the 
contrary, my analysis here suggests that in alienated relations people can 
respond both emotionally and intellectually in a way that takes their objective 
conditions into account. I also think it is wrong to claim, as many commentators 
do, that contemporary politics runs purely on emotions like anger, fear, and loss, 
and that this has distorted or biased people’s rational, cognitive grasp of 
objective reality. The participants in the studies above and the victims of the 
Grenfell Tower fire can speak eloquently and rationally about their emotions and 
of the objective social conditions that make them feel the way they do. Perhaps 
the key word in what Ollman says above, however, is about people not being able 
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to fully take their objective conditions into account. Alienated relations do create 
distortions in some aspects of the way people think and feel, especially towards 
others of their own class who take on roles, like the security guards, that have 
them protecting private property for a wage. Many of the white working class 
participants in Mckenzie’s research also felt that their problems in getting school 
places for their children and good housing in the areas they wanted to live, along 
with more secure well-paid work, were exacerbated not only by austerity cuts to 
services but also by immigration. Yet my brief study here of newspaper reports 
of the responses of victims of the Grenfell Tower fire disaster, shows that they 
too – many of them from ethnic minorities and some who were migrants – 
suffered the same problems as those from the white working class: 
abandonment by authorities and a sense of estrangement from political power 
and influence. The fear of immigration that centres on how it might threaten to 
undercut already depressed wages, or put more pressure on local services 
already at breaking point from austerity spending cuts, is exploited by right wing 
media and politicians, creating another way in which people whose interests are 
very much the same can be divided and alienated from one another. 
What does this mean, though, for the fractious and deeply emotional state of 
contemporary society and politics? Mouffe (2005) has argued that democratic 
politics must be able to mobilise passions towards democratic designs and 
‘needs to have a real purchase on people’s desires and fantasies’ (p. 6). The 
liberal desire to move beyond left and right to reach a state of the post-political is 
bound to fail, as politics must have a partisan character. However, I disagree with 
Mouffe’s Foucaultian/Nietzschean take on this, and her drawing on the ideas of 
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the political theorist Carl Schmitt, arguing that partisanship is necessary because 
politics rests on a recurring ‘agonism’. For me, it is the class divided nature of 
capitalist society, as uncovered in the research I’ve drawn upon here, which 
requires that people’s feeling and thinking is reflected in, and modified by, 
partisan democratic politics and debate. But it is not just a return to partisan 
politics that is necessary. If my analysis is correct and particular social classes 
are experiencing estrangement from democratic institutions that often stand 
against them as a hostile power, then we need to create institutions that can 
overcome this form of alienation. Such institutions would have to be ones with 
which people could identify and make appropriation of the human heritage 
possible – not simply the appropriation of capacities through work, but creating 
capacities through participation in civic and political institutions through which 
people can become part of the ethical life of society (Jaeggi, 2014). 
For Marx (1977), to abolish alienation a society would also have to abolish 
private property and capitalist social relations. If this seems too idealistic, then it 
is important to say that this would not necessarily mean the abolition of all 
tension and disagreement between people, or of misrecognition and failure to 
communicate: it would mean the elimination of the kinds of estrangement and 
class distortions, both within and between social classes, that I have been 
focusing on here. According to Heller (2009), Marx ‘confronted the reduced, 
abstracted, impoverished life of feeling in alienated society with the qualitative 
wealth of feelings of man active in many directions and involved in many 
directions’ (p. 208). Instead of scrambling to make a living in deregulated labour 
markets and under conditions of austerity, if people were more actively involved 
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in political and civic institutions and also had the necessary resources at their 
disposal, the kind of solidarity, fellow-feeling, and spontaneous giving evident in 
the aftermath of the Grenfell Tower fire may be more common across the whole 
of society, not only in times of disaster. 
 
Conclusion 
In this article I have focused on the alienation between people, and between 
people and institutions, which is considered to be a deficient or broken 
relationship – the realm of estrangement. In capitalism, just as producers give up 
the value of their labour power and lose ownership of what they produce, they 
also feel to lose ownership of the political institutions they jointly create, 
recreate, and legitimise – if only passively – as citizens. Indeed, if the relation 
between people and political institutions becomes too estranged, these 
institutions take on the quality of quasi-supreme entities that demand obedience 
from, and act to discipline, those who have created and sustain them. People 
come to feel abandoned by key social institutions that can, in turn, become 
actively hostile to sections of the population. In these estranged relations people 
feel anger and dissatisfaction towards institutions, perhaps even to processes of 
democratic politics, and also feel sadness and loss at the threat to their own 
families and communities that such abandonment results in. There is also a 
structure of feeling in which people perceive the loss of their own social status in 
the eyes of others, as their social position diminishes through the lack of skilled, 
well-paid, and secure employment, and also through the loss of self-pride 
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expressed in neighbourhoods and communities becoming increasingly 
impoverished and lacking cohesion and solidarity of identity. The way people 
come to see their own self is through the distortions of alienated, deficient 
relationships. As social beings, for humans the condition of interdependence is 
universal and has to be reflected in social institutions in which people can 
participate and with which they identify. In the end that is the only answer to the 
particular forms of estrangement that alienation creates, and to the feelings of 
anger, frustration, sadness and loss that seem so deeply entrenched in the 
abandoned sections of modern forms of emotional capitalism. 
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